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Abstract
This paper studies defense mechanisms against model inver-
sion (MI) attacks – a type of privacy attacks aimed at inferring
information about the training data distribution given the ac-
cess to a target machine learning model. Existing defense
mechanisms rely on model-specific heuristics or noise injec-
tion. While being able to mitigate attacks, existing methods
significantly hinder model performance. There remains a ques-
tion of how to design a defense mechanism that is applicable to
a variety of models and achieves better utility-privacy tradeoff.
In this paper, we propose the Mutual Information Regulariza-
tion based Defense (MID) against MI attacks. The key idea
is to limit the information about the model input contained
in the prediction, thereby limiting the ability of an adversary
to infer the private training attributes from the model predic-
tion. Our defense principle is model-agnostic and we present
tractable approximations to the regularizer for linear regres-
sion, decision trees, and neural networks, which have been
successfully attacked by prior work if not attached with any
defenses. We present a formal study of MI attacks by devising
a rigorous game-based definition and quantifying the associ-
ated information leakage. Our theoretical analysis sheds light
on the inefficacy of DP in defending against MI attacks, which
has been empirically observed in several prior works. Our
experiments demonstrate that MID leads to state-of-the-art
performance for a variety of MI attacks, target models and
datasets.
Introduction
Machine learning (ML) techniques have revolutionized many
fields, such as computer vision, natural language process-
ing, and robotics. However, the application of ML to do-
mains involving sensitive and proprietary datasets is currently
hindered by potential privacy threats. Recent studies have
demonstrated various privacy attacks, which can expose the
information about private training data through the access
to a target model. The access could either be whitebox or
blackbox. In the whitebox setting, the adversary has complete
knowledge of the target model, whereas in the blackbox set-
ting, the adversary is just allowed to make prediction queries
against the model. Both settings can find concrete examples
in today’s ML-as-a-service platforms, such as Tensorflow
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Hub which offers a library of models that users can down-
load and Microsoft Azure Cognitive Services which produce
predictions for user-input data.
This paper focuses on MI attacks, a type of privacy attacks
aimed at reconstructing the input associated with any given
model output. MI attacks have been used to recover images
of any person from a face recognition model given just their
name (Zhang et al. 2019) and infer the genetic markers of
individuals based on the medicine dosage prediction and
some demographic information (Fredrikson et al. 2014).
Existing defense mechanisms against MI attacks can be cat-
egorized into two threads. One thread studies model-specific
heuristics to mitigate attacks. For example, for decision trees,
Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart (2015) studied the relation-
ship between a sensitive feature’s depth in the tree and the
model’s susceptibility to MI attacks and provided guidance
for placing the sensitive feature in the tree. Although simple
and efficient to implement, these heuristics cannot be easily
generalized to a broader class of models and often only pro-
vide very limited protection against attacks. Another thread
studies generic defense strategies that can be applied to any
models. An example of such strategies is to train differen-
tially private ML models. However, prior work (Fredrikson
et al. 2014) has empirically shown that DP can mitigate the
MI attack only when the injected noise is large enough and
as a side effect, the model suffers significant performance
degradation. There still remains a question of how to design
a defense mechanism that is applicable to a variety of models
and achieves better utility-privacy tradeoff.
In this paper, we present a defense mechanism against MI
attacks, called MID, which can achieve the state-of-the art
performance for a variety of target models, datasets, and at-
tack algorithms in both blackbox and whitebox settings. Since
MI adversaries exploit the correlation between the model in-
put and output for successful attacks, our idea for the defense
is to limit the redundant information about the model input
contained in the prediction. Algorithmically, we introduce a
regularizer into the training loss, which penalizes the mutual
information between the model input and the prediction. We
present tractable approximations of the regularizer for all the
models that have been successfully attacked before, which
include linear regression, decision trees and neural networks.
In addition, we provide a formal study of MI attacks and
defenses. Particularly, existing theoretical framework for MI
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attacks focuses only on the privacy implications to training
data while neglecting the fact that the attack also breaches
privacy of other data from the same distribution. We take a
first step toward formalizing the distributional privacy risk
of MI attacks. Our theoretical analysis provides insights into
the phenomenon of the inefficacy of DP in defending MI
attacks observed in previous works. We evaluate our defense
mechanism for various target models, datasets, and attack
algorithms, and demonstrate the superiority of our defense to
the existing methods in terms of utility-privacy tradeoff.
Related Work
Attack Algorithms. The first MI attack was demonstrated
in (Fredrikson et al. 2014), where the authors presented a
general algorithm to recover training data associated with an
arbitrary model output given the model and some auxiliary
information about the training set. The general idea of the
algorithm is to formulate the MI attack as an optimization
problem seeking for the sensitive input that achieves the max-
imum likelihood or posterior probability for the given model
output and auxiliary information. Fredrikson et al. (2014)
applied the algorithm to recover genetic markers given the
linear regression model that uses them as part of input fea-
tures. They also found that MI attacks are able to recover
sensitive attributes for not only training data but also test data
drawn independently from domain distribution. Fredrikson,
Jha, and Ristenpart (2015) discussed the application of the
general MI attack algorithm to more complex models includ-
ing decision trees and some shallow neural networks. Zhang
et al. (2019) proposed a whitebox attack algorithm that can
distill generic knowledge from public data and leverage it to
improve the realism of reconstructed images for deep neural
networks. Yang, Chang, and Liang (2019) focused on the
blackbox setting and proposed to train a separate model that
swaps the input and output of the target model to perform
MI attacks. Salem et al. (2019) studied the blackbox MI at-
tacks for online learning, where the attacker has access to
the versions of the target model before and after an online
update and the goal is to recover the training data used to
perform the update. They proposed to train a shadow model
to mimic the target model, and then trains a separate model
that transforms the change of the target model output in two
online learning iterations into the private attributes.
Formalization of MI attacks. Several recent works
started to formalize MI attacks and study the factors that
affect a models vulnerability from a theoretical viewpoint.
Wu et al. (2016) characterized model invertibility for Boolean
functions using the concept of influence from Boolean anal-
ysis; Yeom et al. (2018) formalized the risk that the model
poses specifically to individuals in the training data and
showed that the risk increases with the degree of model over-
fitting. Both works define the privacy loss of MI attacks as
the extent of information leakage of training data exceeds
that of test data. On the contrary, our paper recognizes the
privacy loss suffered by the test data drawn from the same
distribution as training data and presents a formalism of MI
attacks that allows for the analysis of distributional privacy
leakage.
Defenses. There are very few studies about defenses
against MI attacks. One idea is to use DP (Fredrikson et al.
2014). DP provides a theoretical guarantee for training data
privacy, but is not meant to protect the entire distribution.
Zhang et al. (2019) and Fredrikson et al. (2014) observed
through empirical studies that DP cannot provide protection
against MI attacks with reasonable model utility. Our paper
presents a theoretical analysis that can explain the inefficacy
of DP. Other defense ideas are model-specific. For instance,
Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart (2015) proposed to place
sensitive features at a particular depth to improve the robust-
ness of decision trees. There also exists defenses designed
specifically for blackbox attacks on neural networks, such
as injecting uniform noise to confidence scores (Salem et al.
2019), reducing their precision (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ris-
tenpart 2015) or dispersion (Yang et al. 2020). Our defense
differs from existing methods in that our approach is model-
agnostic and applicable to both whitebox and blackbox set-
tings. Also, we will show that our approach can achieve better
utility-privacy tradeoff than the existing methods.
Defense via Mutual Information
Regularization
Problem Setup
In MI attacks, an adversary, given the access to a target model
f trained to predict specific labels Y , uses it to infer the in-
formation about the training data distribution X . We denote
the output of the target model as Yˆ , i.e., Yˆ = f(X). In addi-
tion, the adversary may also have access to some auxiliary
knowledge T that facilitates the inference. Consider the MI
attacks against a face recognition model that labels an image
containing a face with an identity corresponding to the indi-
vidual depicted in the image. The attack goal is to recover
a representative image for some target identity y based on
the access to the target model. Possible auxiliary knowledge
could be corrupted or blurred face images (Yang, Chang, and
Liang 2019; Zhang et al. 2019).
For the face recognition example, both the recovery of a
training image for the target identity in and that of a test image
(i.e., the image that does not appear in the training set but
drawn from the same distribution) would incur privacy loss
to the individual. Hence, it is important to design defenses to
ensure the privacy of the entire training distribution, rather
than just the members in training set. The goal of our defense
is to design an algorithm to train the target model f on the
data distribution (X,Y ) such that the access to the resulting
model does not allow an adversary to infer the information
about P (X|Yˆ = y).
A naive defense is to produce a classifier where Yˆ is in-
dependent of X . In this case, the adversary cannot learn
anything about the input data distribution for a given label.
However, this classifier would clearly be useless in practice.
Hence, there is a tradeoff between privacy and model utility
and we want a defense that can achieve the best tradeoff
between the two.
Figure 1: Illustration of the effect of penalizing I(X; Yˆ ) on
the model output.
Algorithm
Intuitively, we will need to limit the dependency between X
and Yˆ to prevent the adversary from inferring the training
data distribution associated with a specific label. Our idea is
to quantify the dependence between X and Yˆ using their mu-
tual information I(X; Yˆ ) and incorporate it into the training
objective as a regularizer. Specifically, our defense, which
we call MID, trains the target model via the following loss
function:
min
f∈H
E(x,y)∼pX,Y (x,y)[L(y, f(x))] + λI(X, Yˆ ) (1)
where I(X, Yˆ ) = ∫X ∫Y pX,Y (x, y) log( pX,Y (x,y)pX(x)pY (y) )dydx,
L(y, f(x)) is the loss function for the main prediction task,
and λ is the weight coefficient that controls the tradeoff be-
tween privacy and utility on the main prediction task.
To deconstruct the proposed regularizer, we re-write the
mutual information as follows:
I(X, Yˆ ) = H(Yˆ )−H(Yˆ |X) (2)
When f is a deterministic model,H(Yˆ |X) = 0 and introduc-
ing the mutual information regularizer effectively reduces the
entropy of the model output, i.e.,H(Yˆ ). When f is stochas-
tic, the regularizer will additionally promote the uncertainty
of the model output for a fixed input, i.e.,H(Yˆ |X). In prac-
tice, reducingH(Yˆ ) encourages the model output to be more
concentrated and different inputs to be mapped into the same
or very similar outputs; increasing H(Yˆ |X) makes the out-
put to have a larger variance for a given x. Both terms will
make X less likely to be determined from the Yˆ . Figure 1
illustrates this “two-pronged” privacy protection implied by
our mutual information regularizer for a stochastic neural net-
work consisting of a mean and a variance network trained on
FaceScrub dataset. Figure 1 (a) plots the confidence value on
the label class versus the sum of confidence on other classes
for all test data with a particular label. It demonstrates that
the regularizer will lead to more concentrated model outputs.
Figure 1 (b) shows the simulated distribution of confidence
values for a particular image through models trained with
MID. We can see an increased trend of prediction variance
for this input with increased λ, i.e. the strength of the MID
regularizer.
Instantiations of MID
MID provides an appealing defense principle, as it defines
what we mean by an effective defense, in terms of the fun-
damental tradeoff between reducing the input-output depen-
dency and retaining good predictive power. However, com-
puting mutual information is, in general, computational ex-
pensive. It requires modeling the joint distribution of model
input and output and taking an integral over both domains,
which is impracticable for most of the real-world prediction
tasks. Here, we present efficient methods to implement the
mutual information regularizer for different ML models that
have been successfully attacked by previous work, including
linear regression, decision trees, and neural networks. The
unified idea underlying these methods is to find a tractable
approximation to the mutual information regularizer.
Linear Regression. A linear regression model can be writ-
ten as yˆ = Ax. Due to the deterministic nature of the model,
the mutual information regularizer is reduced toH(Yˆ ). We
proposed to approximate the distribution of Yˆ by a Gaussian
mixture:
p(yˆ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N (yˆ|Axi;σ2) (3)
where {xi}Ni=1 is the training set and σ is a free parameter.
We utilizes a Taylor-expansion based approximation for the
entropy of Gaussian mixtures described in Huber et al. (2008)
and derive the following approximation to I(X, Yˆ ):
I˜lin(X, Yˆ ) = (4)
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
1√
2piσ2
exp (−1
2
(
Axi −Axj
σ
)2)
)
Decision Trees. We modify the ID3 (Quinlan 1986), one
of the most classic algorithms for training decision trees, to
incorporate the mutual information regularizer. ID3 begins
with the original training set as the root node. On each itera-
tion of the algorithm, it iterates through every unused feature
and calculates the splitting criterion (e.g. Information Gain
or Gini Impurity), which measures the homogeneity of the
labels within subsets. It then selects the feature achieving
highest score based on the splitting criterion. The training
set is then partitioned by the selected feature to produce sub-
sets of the data. The algorithm continues to recurse on each
subset and consider the features never selected before. In the
inference phase, the decision tree is used to classify new test
cases by traversing the tree using the features of the datum to
arrive at a leaf node and label the datum with the most com-
mon class of the examples in the leaf node. Since decision
trees trained with ID3 are deterministic, the mutual informa-
tion regularizer again reduces to H(Yˆ ). To defend against
the MI attacks, we add −H(Yˆ ) into the splitting criterion.
Specifically, let A denote a feature and C(A) denote some
homogeneity measure. We select the feature A that maxi-
mizes C(A)− λH(Yˆ ) to split on, whereH(Yˆ ) is evaluated
empirically with the training set.
Neural Networks. To come up with a tractable approxi-
mation to I(X; Yˆ ) for neural networks, we get inspiration
from the line of work on information bottleneck (Shwartz-Ziv
and Tishby 2017; Alemi et al. 2016) and regard the neural
network as a Markov chain Y −X −Z − Yˆ , where X is the
feature, Y is the ground truth label, Z is a stochastic encod-
ing of the input X at some intermediate layer and defined
by P (Z|X; θ), and Yˆ is the prediction. By the data process-
ing inequality (Cover 1999), we have I(X, Yˆ ) ≤ I(X,Z).
Prior work has provided various efficient approximation
to I(X,Z) (Alemi et al. 2016; Kolchinsky, Tracey, and
Wolpert 2019). Thus, we replace I(X, Yˆ ) with its upper
bound I(X,Z) in the training objective and train the neural
network with the following loss function:
min
θ
−I(Z;Y ) + λI(Z,X) (5)
The first term encourages the learned encoding to be maxi-
mally informative about the label Y and measures the pre-
diction performance of the model. The second term reduces
the dependency between X and Yˆ by minimizing its upper
bound and improves the robustness against the MI attacks.
Note that the training objective above boils down to the clas-
sic information bottleneck and we will employ the variational
method (Alemi et al. 2016) to approximate the mutual infor-
mation terms in the training objective.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we will formalize the MI attacks and quantify
its distributional privacy loss. Then, we will try to provide a
theoretical basis for the recent observation that DP – a canon-
ical privacy notion nowadays – cannot provide protection
against the MI attacks with reasonable model utility (Zhang
et al. 2019; Fredrikson et al. 2014).
Formalizing MI Attacks
We present a methodology for formalizing the MI attacks. Un-
like previous works that capture the privacy loss of members
in the training set (Wu et al. 2016; Yeom et al. 2018), this is
the first attempt of modeling the privacy loss of members in
the population.
We have been mainly focused on the type of attacks that
aim to recover all dimensions of the feature vector corre-
sponding to a given label. Prior work on the MI attacks has
also considered other types of attacks that only aim to recon-
struct partial dimensions of the feature vector and have access
to the remaining dimensions as auxiliary knowledge. For in-
stance, Fredrikson et al. (2014) studied the MI attacks against
a linear regression model that predict the medicine dosage
based on the input of genotypes and some nonsensitive data
like demographic information. To subsume this attack setting
under our general formalization, we let the input random
variable consists of the sensitive and nonsensitive part, i.e.,
X = (Xs, Xns), and the attacker has access to Xns.
The attacker could also be interested in some specific prop-
erty of the feature vector instead of the entire dimensions.
In the face recognition example, the attacker could be inter-
ested in learning about the properties of a face image, such as
hair color and race, instead of reconstructing the entire face
image (Zhang et al. 2019). To capture this common attack
scenario, we introduce τ to denote the property function that
maps the sensitive feature to the property of the interest to
the attacker.
We abstract the MI attacks into the following semantic MI
game played between the server and the adversary. The game
is described by a tuple (A,M, p, τ), where A denotes the
adversary which is a probabilistic machine with access to the
learning algorithmM and p is the target data distribution.
M : Xn → H is a learning algorithm that takes a dataset as
input and outputs a single, fixed classifier f .H represents the
hypothesis class.
Experiment 1 (Semantic MI ExpSEM(A,M, p, τ))
1. Server draws a training set S ∼ pn, and trains a classifer
f ←M(S).
2. Server draws z = (xns, xs, y) ∼ p. (f, xns, y) is pre-
sented to the adversary A.
3. The adversary outputsAxns,y . ExpSEM(A,M, p, τ) is 1
if Ax,y = τ(xs), and 0 otherwise.
The gain of the game is evaluated as
gainSEM(A,M, p, τ) = Pr[ExpSEM(A,M, p, τ) = 1]
= Pr[Axns,y = τ(xs)] (6)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of S ∼ pn,
the randomness ofM, the randomness of A and the random-
ness of (xs, xns, y) ∼ p. This game directly formalizes the
procedure of MI attack. Trivially, for this game, the best
strategy for the adversary is always output the most probable
τ(xs) when xs ∼ pXs|xns,y. Hence, the best possible gain
for this game is
E(x,y)∼p[max
v
Prxs∼pXs|xns,y [τ(xs) = v]] (7)
To properly measure the adversary’s advantage gained
from the classifier f , we define an alternative underlying
distribution pXs × pXns,Y such that Xs and (Xns, Y ) have
no correlation with each other. That is, sampling xs ∼ pXs
independently from Xns and Y . We define the advantage of
A to be
AdvSEM(A,M, p, τ) = gainSEM(A,M, p, τ)
− gainSEM(A,M, pXs × pXns,Y , τ)
(8)
i.e. gainSEM(A,M, pXs ×pXns,Y , τ) is the trivial baseline
gain of the adversary when there are indeed no correlation
between Xs and (Xns, Y ), and AdvSEM measures the ex-
tra gain the adversary can get. Note that there are multiple
other ways to define the adversary’s advantage which capture
different insights. We defer this discussion to the Appendix.
Protection from Differential Privacy
One dominate privacy notion is DP, which carefully random-
izes an algorithm so that its output does not to depend too
much on any single individual in the dataset (Dwork, Roth
et al. 2014).
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). LetM : Xn → R be a
randomized mechanism. We say thatM is (, δ)-differentially
private if for every two adjacent datasets S ∼ S′ and every
subset R ⊆ R,
Pr[M(S) ∈ R] ≤ ePr[M(S′) ∈ R] + δ (9)
We introduce an indistinguishability game to derive the
robustness guarantee offered by DP. The game is described
by a tuple (A,M, p).
Experiment 2 (Indistinguishability ExpIND(A,M, p))
1. Server chooses b← {0, 1} uniformly at random.
2. Server draws training set S ∼ (p)n if b = 0; S ∼ (pXs ×
pXns,Y )
n if b = 1.
3. Server trains a classifier f ← M(S) and presents f to
the adversary.
4. A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. ExpIND(A,M, p) is 1 if b = b′,
and 0 otherwise.
Let gainIND(A,M, p) = Pr[ExpIND(A,M, p) = 1].
The following theorem shows that the gain of the semantic
MI game can be upper bounded in terms of the best possible
gain of this indistinguishability game.
Theorem 1. For any attack strategy A∗, learning algorithm
M, target distribution p and property function τ ,
AdvSEM(A∗,M, p, τ)≤ 2max
A
gainIND(A,M, p)−1
(10)
Hence, to mitigate the threats of MI attack, we want
maxA gainIND to be not much greater than 1/2.
We will provide a tight bound of gainIND for any attack
strategy A when the learning algorithm is differentially pri-
vate. In the analysis, we assume that with high probability a
training set drawn from pn has no intersection with another
set drawn from (pXs × pXns,Y )n, i.e.,
PrS∼pn,S′∼(pXs×pXns,Y )n [S ∼n S′] = 1− γ (11)
where S ∼n S′ indicates that the two datasets S, S′ ∈ Xn
differ by n entries, and γ is a small value. This assumption
is plausible for many practical scenarios where the feature
vector has continuous domain or is high-dimensional.
Theorem 2. If the learning algorithm M : Xn → R is
(, δ)-differentially private, then with probability at least 1−γ
we have tight bound maxA gainIND(A,M, p) ≤ enen+1 +
en−1
(en+1)(e−1)δ.
As we can see, to make the upper bound e
n
en+1 +
en−1
(en+1)(e−1)δ =
1
2+
en−1
2(en+1)+
en−1
(en+1)(e−1)δ ∈ 12+o(1),
the privacy budget  needs to be set as o( 1n ). However, this
privacy budget is too small to allow any useful computation
(see, e.g., Section 2.3.3 of Dwork, Roth et al. (2014), for
a comprehensive review). Since the bound in Theorem 2 is
tight, with high probability DP cannot mitigate the MI attacks
with any reasonable model utility.
Experiments
In this section, we present the empirical evaluation of the
efficacy of MID against different attacks and compare it with
existing defense mechanisms.
Experiment Setting
Table 1 summarizes our experimental setting, including the
attacks, models, datasets, metrics used in our evaluation as
well as the other defenses that we compare with. We leave
the description of datasets, attack hyper-parameters, model
architectures as well as the details of the evaluation process
and metrics to the Appendix.
Attack algorithms. We compare the efficacy of MID
against the following MI attacks, which are the most effective
ones presented in the literature thus far.
• MAP (Fredrikson et al. 2014; Fredrikson, Jha, and Risten-
part 2015) casts the MI attack as an optimization problem
that seeks for the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP)
estimate of the sensitive attribute under the target model.
For decision trees, if the attacker also has access to the
number of training examples for each path in the tree, it
can further improve the attack performance by improving
the MAP estimate (referred as “white-box with counts” in
(Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015)). We dub these two
attacks Naive MAP and MAP with counts, respectively.
• Knowledge Alignment (Yang, Chang, and Liang 2019) is
a blackbox MI attack, in which the adversary trains an
inversion model that swaps the input and output of the
target model using the dataset drawn from a distribution
similar to the private data distribution. The inversion model
is then used to reconstruct the input feature for any given
target model output.
• Update Leaks (Salem et al. 2019) is a blackbox MI attack
designed for online ML models. It adopts a similar idea
to (Yang, Chang, and Liang 2019) and trains an inver-
sion model to reconstruct the private data. The difference
from (Yang, Chang, and Liang 2019) is that the input to
the inversion model now is the change of the target model
output before and after an online update; moreover, the
inversion model leverages the generative adversarial net-
works to improve the reconstruction accuracy.
• Generative MI (GMI) (Zhang et al. 2019) is a whitebox MI
attack achieving the state-of-the-art performance against
deep neural networks. GMI solves the MAP to recover
the most possible private attribute via gradient descent.
The key idea of GMI is to leverage public data to learn a
generic prior for the private training data distribution and
use it to regularize the optimization problem underlying
the attack.
Defense baselines. We compare our defense with DP for
all attack algorithms, as well as other existing defenses
available for specific models or attacks. We implement the
AdaSSP, differentially private ID3, and DPSGD in (Wang
2018; Friedman and Schuster 2010; Abadi et al. 2016) to
construct differentially private linear regression models, de-
cision trees, and neural networks, respectively. As for more
specialized defenses, we compare with a defense proposed
in (Fredrikson et al. 2014) for decision trees, which adjusts
the depth of the sensitive features. We will use “Priority” to
symbolize this defense. Previous work has also proposed to
Attack Model Dataset Defense Baseline Utility Metrics Attack Metrics
Blackbox
Naive MAP Linear Regression IPWC DP-AdaSSP MSE Acc; AUROC
Naive MAP Decision Tree FiveThirtyEight DPID3; Priority F1 F1
Knowledge Alignment Neural Networks FaceScrub DPSGD Accuracy Acc, L2, ECE
Update-Leaks Neural Networks CIFAR10 DPSGD Accuracy Acc
Whitebox MAP with counts Decision Tree FiveThirtyEight DPID3; Priority F1 F1GMI Neural Networks CelebA DPSGD Accuracy Acc, L2
Table 1: Summary of experimental settings.
defend against blackbox attacks against neural networks by
rounding the output confidence scores (Fredrikson, Jha, and
Ristenpart 2015) or injecting uniform noise to the confidence
vector (Salem et al. 2019). However, our experiments found
that these two defenses are not effective to protect against the
attacks considered in this paper regardless of the rounding
precision or the noise magnitude, respectively. Hence, we do
not exhibit the results for these two defenses.
Evaluation Protocol. We evaluate the performance of a de-
fense mechanism in terms of the privacy-utility tradeoff. All
the defenses considered in our paper have some hyperparam-
eters which we could tune to vary the robustness and model
performance. For the MID and DP, we can vary the weight
parameter λ in Equation 1 and the privacy budget , respec-
tively. For Priority, we can vary the depth of the tree where
we place the sensitive features. In our experiment, we vary
these hyperparameters and generate a utility-privacy tradeoff
curve for each defense. We then use these curves to compare
the performance of different defenses. When the target model
is linear regression and a decision tree, we generate 100 mod-
els with different training and test data split and average the
utility and privacy results over different models for each de-
fense strategy and hyperparameter setting. When the target
model is a neural network, we train 3 models and average
the results. To illustrate the distributional privacy leakage, we
demonstrate the attack performance on both training and test
set for all attacks except GMI and Update-Leaks, since these
two attacks aim at constructing a representative images for
a given label instead of reconstruct a particular image in the
training or test set. To compare the privacy risk of training
and test data for GMI and Update-Leaks, we calculate the L2
distances from deep feature representation of reconstructed
images to that of training images and test images.
Evaluation Metrics. The evaluation metrics for the model
utility and attack performance are listed in Table 1. The utility
metrics depend on the underlying prediction task and datasets.
For regression tasks, we employ mean squared error (MSE);
for classification tasks, we generally use test accuracy as the
metric unless the dataset is highly imbalanced in which case
we use the F1 score. For blackbox attacks on neural networks,
there is a trivial defense to just release the prediction rather
than the entire confidence vector and this defense achieves
good utility in terms of test accuracy. However, this defense
omits useful confidence information. To capture to what ex-
tent the defense worsen the confidence output, we leverage
the Expected Calibration Error (ECE) (Guo et al. 2017), a
metric commonly used to measure the miscalibration between
confidence and accuracy. As for the attack performance, we
follow the papers where the attacks were originally proposed
and mostly use their metrics. Specifically, attack performance
metrics for discrete attribute include accuracy, AUROC, and
F1-score. The latter two are used when the sensitive attributes
are highly imbalanced. To evaluate the attack performance
for images, we build an evaluation classifier to see whether
the image can be recognized as the target class and compute
the attack accuracy. For all the metrics above, the high value
they take, the better attack performance. We also calculate
the L2 distances from deep feature representation of recon-
structed images to that of training images and test images in
order to compare the privacy threats to training and test data.
Results
Figure 2 compares the performance of our defense against
the existing baselines on various blackbox attacks, including
Naive MAP (Figure 2 (a-b)), Knowledge Alignment (Figure 2
(c)), and Update-Leaks (Figure 2 (d)). For Naive MAP, we
demonstrate the results on both linear regression and decision
trees as these two models were successfully attacked by Naive
MAP in prior work (Fredrikson et al. 2014; Fredrikson, Jha,
and Ristenpart 2015). Knowledge Alignment and Update-
Leaks are designed for attacking neural networks, so we only
exhibit the results on neural networks for these two attacks.
Figure 2 shows that MID can consistently achieve a better
utility-privacy tradeoff than DP for protecting against all the
attacks. For decision trees, there exists a model-specific de-
fense strategy, named Priority, which adjusts the depth of the
sensitive feature. Figure 2 (b) shows that MID is more robust
than Priority in most cases except when model has a very high
performance (i.e., F1 score > 0.57). Nevertheless, Priority
has its own drawbacks: firstly, it is only applicable to decision
trees; and second, it only protects a subset of attributes, or
the sensitive attributes, which could be subject to additional
privacy concern because one may leverage the correlation
between nonsensitive attributes and sensitive attributes to
recover the sensitive one. On the other hand, the principles of
MID and DP are applicable to different types of models and
protect all the attributes at once. A phenomenon consistently
present in all attacks is that the more predictive power the
model has, the more vulnerable it is to the attacks, regardless
of the types of defenses attached to the model. This finding
signifies the difficulty to defend against the MI attacks; yet,
our defense can significantly improve the model robustness
Figure 2: Defense result for blackbox MI attacks, including (a-b) Naive MAP on linear regression and decision trees, (c)
Knowledge Alignment and (d) Update-Leaks on neural networks.
for any fixed model performance. We also evaluate the at-
tack performance in terms of other metrics shown in Table 1.
As they give the similar results to the metrics exhibited in
Figure 2, we will omit these results to the Appendix.
Figure 3: Confidence calibration of defenses evaluated on the
(a) Knowledge Alignment and the (b) Update-Leaks attack.
Figure 3 illustrates the miscalibration between confidence
and accuracy as the result of different defenses. The degree
of miscalibration is measured by ECE. We find that MID
mostly achieves significantly lower ECE error than DP for a
given robustness level.
Figure 4 illustrates the defense results for whitebox at-
tacks. Specifically, we consider GMI, the state-of-the-art
attack against neural networks, and MAP with counts, the
only known attack against decision trees; the corresponding
privacy-utility tradeoff curves are shown in Figure 4 (b) and
(c), respectively. We find that MID can outperform DP by a
large margin to defend against whitebox MI attacks. Similar
to the observation in blackbox experiment, model-specific
defense strategies could achieve better robustness than MID
occasionally; but overall, MID could be more preferable
due to its broad applicability, thorough protection for all at-
tributes, and reliable performance. Figure 4 (a) compares
the reconstructed images of MID and DP. We tune the hy-
perparameters of both defenses so that the resulting target
models have comparable performance. The test accuracies
for the models trained with MID and DP are 80.8 and 81.4,
respectively. We can see that MID can block the attack much
better than DP. For instance, the reconstructions for DP can
still retain many facial features of the target individual while
the reconstructions for MID are almost completely different
from the target individual.
One common observation from all defense results is that
the attack performance is very close on training and test
set. This implies that MI attacks pose similar privacy threats
regardless of whether an individual’s data is selected for
training or not. Although some prior works (Yeom et al. 2018;
Figure 4: Defense results for whitebox MI attacks, including
(a-b) GMI on neural networks and (c) MAP with counts on
decision trees.
Dwork et al. 2015) report that the attack performance on the
training set is much higher than the test set, we conjecture
that it is because the model overfits the training data in their
evaluations. In our experiments, since both MID and DP can
help mitigate overfitting, the privacy threats of MI attacks is
presented to the population instead of the training set only.
Conclusion
We propose a defense against MI attacks based on regular-
izing the mutual information between the model input and
prediction and further present tractable approximations to the
regularizer for linear regression, decision trees, and neural
networks. We provide theoretical basis for a common empiri-
cal observation that DP cannot defend against MI attacks with
reasonable model utility. We perform experiments to compare
the utility-privacy tradeoff of our defense against existing
baselines on different models and datasets, and demonstrate
that our proposed defense can achieve the state-of-the-art per-
formance to protect against various attacks in both whitebox
and blackbox settings. One limitation of our defense is that it
does not prevent the attack but instead aim for better utility-
privacy tradeoff. For future work, we would like to further
improve our defense from the perspective of computational
security, i.e., by assuming a polynomial time adversary.
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